









The ECN plus Directive: The Harmonization of National Procedural Rules Governing the Parallel Enforcement of European Union Competition Law in the Internal Market. 











Why was Directive 2019/1 proposed by the Commission  ?

1.	Since 2004, the national competition authorities (NCAs) of the Member States have been empowered by Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to apply the EU competition rules alongside the Commission. ​[3]​ They are, as such, co-enforcers with the Commission working in close cooperation in the European Competition Network (ECN) thus ensuring the successful complementary implementation of EU Competition law, at both European and national levels.​[4]​ Indeed, Article 3 of the Regulation obliges NCAs and national courts when applying national competition law, within the meaning of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU which may affect trade between Member States, to apply the EU competition rules. However, Regulation 1/2003 is silent on the specific operational characteristics and investigative powers of NCAs designated by the Member States in accordance with Article 35 to ensure the effective enforcement, in parallel with the Commission, of European Union Competition Law.  

2.	Article 35 merely sets down the requirement that Member States should designate the competition authority or authorities in such a way that the provisions of the regulation are effectively complied with but left it to the Member States to adopt the measures necessary to empower the authorities, administrative and judicial, to apply Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. This includes the allocation of powers and functions. In short, Regulation 1/2003 empowers NCAs to co-enforce the EU competition rules and it establishes in Article 5 their powers to adopt decisions to bring infringements to an end.​[5]​ It does not address the means and instruments of NCAs to apply these rules. This means that although the NCAs apply the same substantive rules, the means and the instruments they have to do so depend on what is available under national law. That said, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in VEBIC​[6]​ ruled that the authorities so designated must in accordance with the regulation, ensure that those Treaty Articles are applied effectively in the general interest.  The detailed provisions in national law concerning the power and functioning of NCAs must not put at risk the attainment of the objective of the regulation which is to ensure that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are applied effectively by those authorities. In Schenker, the Court of Justice also added the requirement to be met by NCAs of uniform application of those Treaty Articles.​[7]​ 

3.	Not surprisingly, perhaps, over the years Member States have adopted measures regarding the operational characteristics and investigative powers of their NCAs that differ resulting in the uneven enforcement of the EU competition provisions, including enforcement deficits or gaps in some Member States, and consequently the distortion of competition in the internal market. Indeed, the CJEU had to interpret on a number of occasions the provisions of Regulation 1/2003 in preliminary references from national courts regarding the compatibility of national procedural law provisions relating to the rights and obligations of NCAs with the obligation to ensure the effective application of Union competition law. ​[8]​

4.	In 2014, the Commission published its Communication assessing the first Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003. It concluded that there was scope for the NCAs, now a key pillar of the enforcement system, to be more effective enforcers and identified a number of areas for action to boost effective enforcement by NCAs.​[9]​

5.	The Commission found the following limitations on the ability of NCAs to be effective enforcers.  First, some NCAs do not have legal safeguards ensuring that they can apply EU competition rules without taking instructions from public or private entities.​[10]​ Secondly, a number of NCAs struggle with insufficient human, technical and financial resources. Thirdly, many NCAs do not have all the tools they need to detect and tackle competition law infringements effectively. Some NCAs do not have key investigative powers such as the ability to gather evidence stored on mobile phones, laptops, and tablets which is a key drawback in the digital age.  Fourth, not all NCAs can impose effective fines. In some Member States, national law prevents NCAs from imposing fines for breaches of EU Competition law.  The level of fines imposed varies greatly so that the penalty for the same offence can be much higher in one Member State than another without that difference being justified by objective circumstances. Thus, the Commission found that 3 NCAs lacked the fundamental power to inspect the homes of business people for evidence of infringement, 6 NCAs cannot access data stored on clouds or servers located on other countries, 5 cannot access mobile phones in inspections and 11 NCAs cannot impose structural remedies to restore competition on markets.  Indeed, in some Member States entities can restructure to escape paying fines. Fifth, divergences in leniency programmes across the Member States discourage companies and individuals from coming clean and providing evidence of anti-competitive practices. The Commission pointed out in its impact assessment accompanying the proposed Directive, that companies that choose to cooperate are required to provide self-incriminating leniency material. However, the level of protection granted for such material varies significantly.  For example, in 20 Member States leniency statements are accessible to public prosecutors and or the police, who could use it for purposes other than for the enforcement of EU competition rules. In 12 Member States, civil courts in proceedings other than actions for damages have access to such statements. This might expose companies cooperating with the competition authorities to liability to other proceedings.  Sixth, the Commission found that many NCAs do not have adequate fact-finding tools.  Finally, other gaps in the NCAs’ ability to provide mutual assistance also undermine the European system of competition enforcement which is designed to work as a cohesive whole. It pointed out as an example, that administrative NCAs cannot request the enforcement of their fines across borders if the infringer has no legal presence in their territory.  It found that in the digital era, where many companies sell over the internet, potentially to numerous countries, but where they have a legal presence in only one Member State, these companies currently have a safe haven from paying fines.​[11]​

6.	In the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for the Directive, the Commission pointed out that the level of enforcement is very uneven not only because of the diverging market sizes in the Member States.  It is also uneven because with respect to the relevant investigative powers, some NCAs lack the fundamental power to inspect the homes of business people for evidence of infringements or access evidence stored in digital form, access mobile phones in inspections, or stored on clouds or servers located in other countries. It found that regarding the relevant decision-making powers, 11 NCAs cannot impose structural remedies to restore competition on markets.​[12]​

7.	The Commission concluded that action should be taken to strengthen the ability of NCAs to be effective enforcers in four areas. First, that NCAs should have adequate resources and operational independence when applying EU competition law. Secondly, that NCAs must all have effective enforcement toolkits to detect infringements and bring them to an end.  Thirdly, they should be able to impose deterrent fines on companies. Finally, that they should have leniency programmes that work effectively across Europe. Following the 2014 Communication, extensive research was carried out by the Commission in cooperation with all NCAs to have a detailed picture of the situation prevailing in each of the Member States.  This was followed by a public consultation with interested stakeholders, a public hearing, and meetings with relevant Ministries to get their preliminary feedback.​[13]​ The results of these public encounters and consultations were fed into what become known as the ECN+ proposal. 

8.	In essence, the research and consultations conducted by the Commission indicated gaps and limitations in NCAs enforcement toolkits in five key areas that would need tackling in any proposal for legislative action at EU level despite a good degree of voluntary action at Member State level, in the direction of giving NCAs the tools they need to be effective enforcers.  According to the Commission, there is untapped potential for more effective enforcement of the EU competition rules by the NCAs, because despite voluntary action by the Member States, many of them do not have all the means and instruments they would need to effectively enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. First, there is the lack of legal guarantees in many Member States that are designed to ensure the operational independence and resources needs of NCAs. Secondly, many NCAs do not have all the tools they need to effectively detect and tackle competition law infringements.  Thirdly, many NCAs lack the powers to impose effective fines. Fourthly, divergences in leniency programmes across the Union discourages companies from coming clean and providing evidence of these anti-competitive practices. Finally, according to the Commission, the gaps and limitations in NCAs’ tools and guarantees also undermine the system of parallel powers for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU based on close cooperation and mutual assistance when required, within the ECN.  According to the Commission, because of the significant differences in the national rules governing the enforcement capabilities of NCAs, companies engaging in anti-competitive practices can face very different outcomes of proceeding depending on the Member States in which they are active. Indeed, according to the Commission, they may be subject to no enforcement at all or ineffective enforcement and uneven enforcement of the EU competition distorts competition in the internal market and it undermines the system of decentralized co-enforcement that was put in place by Regulation 1/2003.​[14]​

The Main Objectives of Directive 2019/1

9.	On 22 March 2017, the European Union Commission adopted a proposal for a directive to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. The intention was to complement Regulation 1/2003, which empowers NCAs to apply the EU competition rules alongside the Commission thereby creating a decentralized system of EU competition rules enforcement.  It is intended to give substance to the requirement in Article 35 of the Regulation, so that Member States designate and empower NCAs in such a way that the provisions of the Regulation are effectively and uniformly implemented to create, as far as possible, a common enforcement area. Ensuring that the NCAs have effective decision-making and fining powers should mean that the requirements of Article 5 of the Regulation which confers on NCAs the right to adopt decisions and fines, when applying Article 101 and 102 TFEU, are fully respected.​[15]​

10.	To address the problems identified by the Commission, the Directive includes provisions  designed  to address national rules which prevent NCAs from being effective enforcers, rules ensuring that the same guarantees and instruments are in place for national competition law when it is applied in parallel with EU competition rules, rules to ensure all NCAs have key guarantees of independence and resources, that they have an effective enforcement toolkit, that they can all impose deterrent fines, that they should all have effective leniency programmes in place,  and provisions putting in place effective rules on mutual assistance. 

11.	 In October 2015, when the Commission announced its updated single market strategy,​[16]​ it stated that effective compliance is essential to deliver the opportunities and benefits of the single market and that a more consistent and efficient enforcement policy would improve overall compliance with single market rules and EU law in general. On 26 May 2016, the European Parliament in its resolution on the Commission’s single market strategy, encouraged the Commission to prioritize and deepen its work on enforcement by focusing on ensuring greater administrative coordination, cooperation and enforcement of the many measures already adopted.​[17]​

12.	NCAs have since 2004 been responsible for 865 competition decisions compared to the Commission’s 128 which equals 85% of decisions. They thus play a key role in making sure that EU Competition rules are enforced.  According to the Commission, less effective enforcement means that the conditions for markets to function efficiently are not ensured. Businesses cannot compete fairly on their merits and face barriers to market entry. Consumers miss out on the benefits of competition enforcement, namely lower prices, better quality, or wider choice.​[18]​

13.	The key objective of the Directive is therefore to establish an enforcement level playing field throughout the internal market by requiring the Member States to harmonize, on the basis of a core set of uniform powers and guarantees, the operational characteristics and investigative powers of their administrative competition authorities.  The Directive requires the Member States to ensure that NCAs have the guaranties of independence, resources, and enforcement and fining powers necessary to apply the competition rules effectively, both national and European Union, when applied in parallel as set down in Article 3(1) of Regulation 1/2003.

Overview of the Directive

14.	 The Directive is divided into 10 Chapters and 37 Articles. In broad terms, Articles 1 and 2 set out the scope and key definitions. Article 3 addresses the important issue of safeguards. Articles 4 and 5 lays down requirements in order for NCAs be able to perform their duties and exercised their powers independently from political, public and other external influences. The Directive seeks to ensure that NCAs have the power to set their priorities in individual cases including the power to reject complaints for priority reasons.  In addition, Article 5 introduces the requirement for Member States to ensure that NCAs have the human, financial and technical resources necessary to perform their core tasks.  Article 6 to 12 provide for the core minimum effective powers to investigate (to inspect business and non-business, to issue requests for information) and to take decisions (the power to adopt prohibition decisions including the power to impose structural and behavioral remedies or commitment decisions).  The Directive also provides for effective sanctions for non-compliance. These will be calculated in proportion to total worldwide turnover.  Articles 13 to 16 deal with fines and penalty payments. To ensure NCAs can set deterrent fines on the basis of a common set of core parameters: first, there is to be a common legal maximum of no less than 10% of worldwide turnover and second, when setting the fine, NCAs should have regard to the core factors of the gravity and duration of the infringement. Articles 17 to 23 deal with leniency and will ensure that employees and directors of companies that file for immunity are protected from individual sanctions.  Articles 24 to 28 describe the cross-border mutual assistance rules. If, for instance, one NCA requests another NCA to carry out investigative measures on its behalf, officials from the requesting NCA have the right to attend and actively assist in that inspection. Article 29 concerns the rules on limitation periods for the imposition of fines and periodic penalty payments. Articles 30 to 33 establish the requirements placed on Member States regarding the role of national administrative competition authorities before national courts, access to the file by parties and limitations on the use of information, the admissibility of evidence before NCAs, and the operation of the ECN.  Articles 34 to 37 concern transposition, review and entry into force. The Directive has 77 recitals, which is not an insignificant number, explaining, clarifying and justifying the operative provisions of a complex Directive. 

15.	The Directive was adopted on the dual legal basis of Articles 103 and 114 TFEU. Recital 9 of the Directive states that this is because the Directive includes measures determining the relationship between national laws and the effective application of the competition rules, both Union and national when applied in parallel, as provided for in Article 103 TFEU and measures designed to eliminate the gaps and limitations in the tools and guarantees of NCAs that may negatively affect the uniform enforcement of the competition rules and therefore the proper functioning of the internal market as laid down in Article 114 TFEU.

16.	It is interesting to note that Directive 2014/104/EU governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and the European Union was also adopted on the dual legal basis of Articles 103 and 114 TFEU. The differences in liability regimes regarding the right to compensation for victims of competition law infringements applicable in the Member States resulted in the uneven enforcement of competition law and the proper functioning of the internal market. In essence, Article 103 in combination with Article 114 TFEU has been used to justify the harmonization of key aspects of national procedural law relating to the public and private enforcement of Union and national competition law.​[19]​ 

17.	During the legislative process, the Council and the European Parliament reached agreement on the proposed Directive in a number of ways.  First, companies under investigation must be informed of the preliminary objections raised against them in a statement of objections.  This has not been the practice in all the Member States.  Second, the members of the decision-making body of NCAs must be selected, recruited and appointed according to clear and transparent procedures laid down in advance and that they should have a sufficient number of staff and sufficient financial, technical and technological resources. Third, if two remedies are equally effective, NCAs should favour the least burdensome for the undertaking in line with the principle of proportionality. Fourth, the legality and proportionality of ‘interim measures’ may be reviewed in expedited appeal procedures. Fifth, NCAs should have a leniency programme allowing them to grant immunity from fines to undertakings for secret cartels. Finally, in order to reduce administrative and other considerable burdens in terms of time, it should be possible for applicants to submit statements in relation to full or summary applications as well as requests for ‘markers’ either in an official language of the Member of the NCA concerned, or, where bilaterally agreed between the NCA and the applicant, in another official language of the Union.​[20]​


Outline of the Key Provisions of the ECN Plus Directive

Scope, Fundamental Rights, Independence and Resources of NCAs

18.	Chapter 1, Article 1 sets down the subject matter and scope of the Directive.  With regards to the subject matter, the key objective of the Directive is to establish a common set of rules to ensure that NCAs have the necessary guarantees of independence, resources and enforcement and fining powers to be able to effectively apply the TFEU Articles 101 and 102 prohibitions on cartels and abuse of dominance.  The justification for the Directive is that wide differences in national laws and measures are currently preventing NCAs from being effective enforcers of the competition rules with the result that competition in the internal market is being distorted and consumers and undertakings are being put at a disadvantage.  With regards to the scope of application of the Directive, Article 1(2) provides that it covers the application of Union competition law and the parallel application of national competition law to the same case and under certain circumstances, such as rights of access to leniency statements or settlement submission and use of information set down in Article 31 (3) and 31(4) of the Directive, to the application of national competition law on a stand-alone basis.  Finally, Article 1(3) sets out certain rules on mutual assistance to safeguard the smooth functioning of the internal market and the smooth functioning of the system of close cooperation within the ECN.


19.	Chapter 2 covers Fundamental Rights. Article 3 deals with the important issue of safeguards for the protection of the fundamental rights of parties’ subject to infringement proceedings. When conducting proceedings and the exercise of the powers referred to in the Directive, NCAs must comply with the general principles of Union law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union. Member States must ensure that NCAs respect undertakings’ rights of defense, including the right to be heard and the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal.  Member States must also ensure that enforcement proceedings are conducted within a reasonable time frame and that prior to taking a decision pursuant to Article 10 of the Directive regarding the finding and termination of infringement, NCAs adopt a statement of objections.

20.	Chapter 3 concerns the subject of the Independence and Resourcing of NCAs. Articles 4 and 5 set out a number of important requirements to be complied with by the Member States regarding the independence and resources of national administrative authorities. The two provisions form a central pillar in the drive to ensure the operational independence of  national authorities. To some extent, they mirror many of the obligations placed on the Member States in the Telecommunications Directives regarding the operational independence of national telecommunications regulators.​[21]​

21.	Article 4 of the Directive sets out, in a very detailed way, a set of specific obligations placed on the Member States to ensure the operational independence of NCAs.  Thus, the Member States must ensure that such authorities perform their duties and exercise their powers impartially and in the interests of the effective and uniform application of Article 101 and 102 TFEU. Specifically, Member States must ensure, in particular, that staff and persons who take decisions exercising the powers set down in Article 10 to 13 and 16 of the Directive are able to perform their duties and exercise their powers independently from political and other external influence. Moreover, that they neither seek nor take any instructions from government or any other public or private entity when carrying out their duties and exercising their powers. They should also refrain from taking any action which is incompatible with the performance of their duties and are subject to procedures that ensure that for a reasonable period of time after leaving office they refrain from dealing with enforcement proceedings that could give rise to conflicts of interest. 


22.	Finally, and perhaps crucially, in terms of their operational independence and autonomy, Article 4 sets out that Member States must ensure that national administrative competition authorities must have the power to set their priorities for carrying out the tasks for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.  In essence, if where they are obliged by national law to consider formal complaints, they shall henceforth have the power to reject such complaints on the grounds that they do not consider such complaints to be an enforcement priority. 


23.	Article 5 deals with the vexed question of the resources and their use, made available to NCAs by the Member States.   The language employed is curious to say the least.

24.	Article 5 requires Member States to ensure at a minimum, that NCAs have a sufficient number of qualified staff and sufficient financial, technical and technological resources that are necessary for the effective performance of their duties, and for the effective exercise of the powers for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.  The Article lists and defines the duties and powers that NCAs must have at a minimum. Thus, they must have the resources to conduct investigations with a view to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. They must be able to adopt decisions applying Articles 101 and 102 on the basis of Article 5 of Regulation No 1/2003. Furthermore, they must have the resources to cooperate closely in the ECN with a view to ensuring the effective and uniform application of the competition law provisions. Finally, to the extent provided by national law, NCAs should have sufficient resources to be able to advise public institutions and bodies, where appropriate, on legislative, regulatory and administrative measures which may have an impact on competition in the internal market and also promote public awareness of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 

25.	Member States must also ensure that NCAs are granted independence in the spending of the allocated budget for the purpose of carrying out their tasks and duties.  Article 5 also lays down that Member States must ensure that NCAs must produce periodic reports on their activities and their resources to a governmental or parliamentary body.  The reports must be publicly available and include information regarding the appointments and dismissals of members of the decision-making body, the amount of resources that were allocated in the relevant year, and any changes in that amount compared to previous years. In essence, this reporting requirement provides the Commission with the means to monitor Member State compliance with their obligations regarding the independence and resourcing of NCAs under Article 4 and 5 of the Directive. 

Powers of Investigation and Decision Making

26.	Chapter 4 includes Articles 6 to 12 of the Directive that set down requirements on Member States to ensure that NCAs have a uniform set of powers.  They replicate to a great extent the powers conferred on the Commission by Regulation 1/2003.  Thus Articles 6 to 16 of the Directive essentially provide NCA’s with the investigatory and decisions making powers that the Commission already has under Regulation 1/2003. These include, the power to search business and ‘other’ premises, the power to request information and to summons individuals, the power to impose behavioural and structural remedies,  the power to issue interim orders, the power to adopt commitment decisions, the power to impose fines on ‘undertakings’ as defined in EU law, the power to issue periodic penalty payments, and the establishment of uniform rules on the calculation of fines to include factors such as the duration and gravity of the infringement.

27.	 Article 6 sets out the obligations on Member States regarding the powers that must be conferred on national administrative competition authorities to inspect business premises.  It is the equivalent provision of Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003.  Thus, they must be empowered to conduct all necessary unannounced inspections of undertakings and associations of undertaking and all officials and other accompanying persons authorised or appointed to conduct such inspections must be empowered, at a minimum, to enter any premises, land and means of transports of those subject to the investigation.  They must also be empowered to examine the books and other records related to the business irrespective of the medium on which it is stored and have the right to access any information which is accessible to the entity subject to the investigation.  They must have the power to take or obtain, in any form, copies of or extracts from such books or records and, where they consider it appropriate, to continue making such searches for information and the selection of copies or extracts at the premises of the NCAs or at any other designated premises. They must also be accorded the power to seal any business premises and books or records for the period and to the extent necessary for the inspection and to ask any representative or member of staff of the entity being inspected for explanations on facts or documents relating to the subject matter and purpose of the inspection and to record the answers.  On the other hand, Article 6 sets out that the Article is without prejudice to requirements under national law for the prior authorisation of such inspections by a national judicial authority.

28.	Article 7 requires Member States to ensure that if a reasonable suspicion exists that books or other records related to the business and to the subject of the inspection, which may be relevant to prove an infringement, are being kept in any premises , land or means other than those referred to in Article 6, including the homes of directors, managers, and other members of staff of the entity or entities being inspected, the NCAs are able to conduct unannounced inspections in such premises, land and means of transport.   It is the equivalent provision of Article 21 of Regulation 1/2003.  Finally, Article 7 provides that such inspections of including the homes of individuals shall not be carried out without the prior authorisation of a national judicial authority.  

29.	Article 10 of the Directive requires Member States to ensure that, where NCAs find an infringement of the competition law prohibitions, including infringements committed in the past, they may by decision require those concerned to bring that infringement to an end. It is the equivalent provision of Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003.   For that purpose, they must empower NCAs to impose, if they so decide, any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end.  However, when choosing between two equally effective remedies, NCAs shall choose the remedy that is least burdensome for the undertaking, in line with the principle of proportionality.  

30.	Article 11 requires Member States to ensure that NCAs are empowered to act on their own initiative to order by decision the imposition of interim measures in cases where there is urgency due to the risk of serious and irreparable harm to competition, on the basis of a prima facie finding of an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.  It is the equivalent provision of Article 8 of Regulation 1/2003.  The Article provides for safeguards. First, such a decision shall be proportionate and shall apply either for a specified time period, which may be renewed if absolutely necessary and appropriate, or until the final decision is taken. NCAs must inform the ECN of the imposition of those interim measures. A final safeguard in this regard is provided for by the requirement that Member States shall ensure that the legality, including the proportionality, of interim measures can be reviewed in expedited appeal procedures.

31.	Chapter 4 of Directive 2019/1 concludes with Article 12. According to Article 12, Member States are to provide that in enforcement proceedings initiated with a view to adopting a decision requiring that an infringement of the competition rules be brought to an end, NCAs may, after seeking the views of market participants, by decision, make commitments offered by the infringers binding, where those commitments meet the concerns of the NCAs. Such a decision may be adopted for a specified period and shall conclude that there are no longer grounds for action by the national authority concerned.  Member States must ensure that NCAs have effective powers to monitor the implementation of the binding commitments.  They must also ensure that NCAs are able to reopen enforcement proceedings in three circumstances. First, where there have been material changes to any of the facts on which a decision accepting the commitments of the infringing entities was based. Second, where the infringing parties act contrary to their commitments. Thirds, where a decision accepting the binding commitments of the infringing entities was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information provided by the parties. It is the equivalent provision of Articles 9 and 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003.  

32.	Chapter 5 includes the provisions harmonizing national rules concerning the imposition by NCAs of fines and penalty payments. It includes the equivalent provisions of Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation 1/2003.  Under Article 13, Member States must ensure that national administrative competition authorities may either impose by decision in their own enforcement proceedings, or request in non-criminal judicial proceedings, the imposition of effective, proportionate and dissuasive fines on infringers where, intentionally or negligently, they have infringed the competition law prohibitions in Article 101 or 102 TFEU.

33.	Member States must also ensure at a minimum that fines shall be determined in proportion to the total worldwide turnover of undertakings or association of undertakings. This is where intentionally or negligently they fail to comply with an inspection. 


34.	Article 15 requires Member States to ensure that the maximum of the fine that an NCA may impose on each undertaking or association of undertakings is not less than 10% of the total worldwide turnover of the undertaking or association of undertakings in the business year preceding the infringement decision. Where an infringement by an association of undertakings relates to the activities of members, the maximum amount of the fine shall be not less than 10% of the sum of the total worldwide turnover of each member active on the market affected by the infringement of the association.  







36.	Chapter 6 of Directive 2019/1 covers the requirements to be met by the Member States regarding the putting in place of harmonized rules on leniency and immunity from fines in order to more effectively investigate and prosecute secret cartels. Article 17 stipulates that Member States shall ensure that NCAs have in place leniency programmes that enable them to grant immunity from fines to undertakings for disclosing their participation in secret cartels. 

37.	Member States must ensure that immunity from fines is granted only where the applicant is able to satisfy the general conditions for leniency laid down in Article 19. The conditions include, that the applicant has ended its involvement in the alleged secret cartel immediately following its leniency application, except for what would, in the competent NCA’s view, be reasonably necessary to preserve the integrity of its investigation. That the applicant cooperates genuinely, fully, on a continuous basis and expeditiously until the NCA has closed its enforcement proceedings by adopting a decision or has otherwise terminated its enforcement proceedings. 


38.	In accordance with Article 17, immunity is also only granted where the applicant discloses its participation in a secret cartel, and is the first to submit evidence which enables the NCA to carry out a targeted inspection in connection with the secret cartel , provided that the NCA did not yet have in its possession sufficient evidence to carry out such an inspection or had not already carried out such an inspection, or in the NCA’s view, is sufficient for it to find an infringement covered by the leniency programme, provided that the authority did not yet have in its possession sufficient evidence to find such an infringement, and that no other undertaking previously qualified for immunity from fines in relation to that secret cartel in accordance with the condition enabling the NCA to carry out a targeted inspection.

39.	Member States must ensure that all undertakings are eligible for immunity from fines, with the exception of undertakings that have taken steps to coerce other undertakings to join a secret cartel or to remain in it. Member States must also ensure that NCA’s inform the applicant of whether or not it has been granted conditional immunity. This may be in writing at the request of the applicant and where an NCA rejects an application for immunity, the applicant may request that the NCA consider its application as an application for reduction in fines.







41.	Chapter 7 includes the provisions covering one of the core aspects of the Directive. Namely, the rules regarding cooperation and mutual assistance between competition authorities because of the importance of cooperation and mutual assistance between NCAs in the decentralized system of enforcement put in place by Regulation 1/2003. The Chapter includes provisions requiring Member States to ensure that measures are adopted governing their cooperation, the notification of preliminary objections where the addressee is in a different jurisdiction, requests for enforcement decisions imposing fines or periodic penalty payments, the general principles of cooperation and rules governing dispute resolution between competition authorities. 


Limitation Periods, the Procedural Rights of NCAs before national courts, 

42.	Article 29 of Chapter 8 of the Directive covers the rules to be applied regarding limitation periods. Member States must ensure that if proceedings are on-going before an NCA or the Commission, the limitation periods applicable for other NCAs that may bring proceedings regarding the same agreement, decision of an association of undertakings or concerted practice are suspended for the duration of these proceedings. This is designed to ensure that the system of parallel powers within the ECN works effectively and other NCAs are not prevented from subsequently acting as a result of their proceedings being time-barred.  The Commission shall ensure that the notification of the first formal investigative measure received from an NCA under Article 11(3) of Regulation 1/2003 is made available to the other NCAs within the ECN.  Member States remain free to determine the duration of limitation periods in their system or to introduce absolute limits provided they do not render the effective enforcement of European Union competition law practically impossible or excessively difficult.

 
43.	Chapter 10 covers the final provisions regarding transposition, review, entry into force and addresses. Member States must bring into force the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Directive by 4 February 2021.  


Analysis and Concluding Remarks

44.	It is perhaps appropriate to consider from the outset whether the Commission’s initial ambition of ensuring that NCAs are accorded Commission-like powers and resources are met by the Directive.  According to the Commission, the Directive gives NCAs effective enforcement tools and the necessary resources to detect and sanction companies that break EU competition rules and ensures that they can take their decisions in full independence to bring about a genuine common competition enforcement area.  Specifically, the new rules  require Member States to ensure that NCAs are able to act independently when enforcing EU competition rules and work in a fully impartial manner, have the necessary financial and human resources to do their work, have all the powers needed to gather relevant evidence, have adequate tools to impose proportionate and deterrent sanctions for breaches of EU antitrust rules, and have coordinated, and uniform leniency programmes which encourage to companies to come forward with evidence of illegal cartels.  The Directive also ensures that NCAs are able to prioritize their proceedings for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102TFEU to make effective use of their resources and to allow them to reject complaints on the ground they are not a priority.

45.	The Directive significantly enhances the possibility of creating a genuine common competition enforcement area by putting in place rules enabling NCAs to carry out inspections on behalf of other NCAs, rules ensuring that NCAs are able to enforce through other NCAs in the ECN, the payment of fines against infringing companies that do not have a legal presence on their territory,  and at the request of another NCA notify an undertaking present on its territory of preliminary objections and any other procedural act adopted in the context of enforcement proceeding.  Importantly, the scope of the Directive covers both the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU on a stand-alone basis and the parallel application of national competition law to the same case.  According to recital 3 of the Directive, because NCAs are obliged to apply Article 101 and 102 TFEU and national competition law in parallel to practices which are capable of affecting trade between Member States, it is essential that the NCAs have the same guarantees of independence, resources, and enforcement and fining powers necessary to ensure that a different outcome is not reached.  The Directive also covers the protection of leniency statements and settlement submissions when national competition law is applied on a stand-alone basis.  In this respect the Directive is designed to ensure the even enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and national competition law when applied in parallel or indeed with regards to national competition law on a stand-alone basis. The Directive thus seeks to ensure that NCAs have at their disposal the same enforcement powers and capabilities regardless of whether they are enforcing EU or national competition law. In this regard it is submitted that nearly 15 years after the coming into force of Regulation 1/2003. The Directive, in effect, takes out of the hands of the Member States the way in which the provisions of the Regulation are to be effectively complied with when enforced by national administrative competition authorities. This includes the measures previously reserved as a competence accorded to the Member States, necessary to empower NCAs to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and indeed national competition law. In that regard the Directive is a very significant harmonizing measure that creates NCAs with an equal set of core powers and operational safeguards. 

46.	That said, while the Directive has the primary objective to ensure that NCAs are empowered to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU uniformly and effectively by putting in place a core set of requirements on the Member States, national rules are not completely excluded from the picture. Member States are still able to maintain or introduce more extensive guarantees of independence and resources for administrative NCAs and more detailed rules on the enforcement and fining powers of NCAs. Recital 10 provides that Member States should be able to endow NCAs with additional powers beyond the core set provided by the Directive to further enhance their effectiveness such as powers to impose fines on natural persons, or by way of exception, the power to carry out inspection with the consent of those subject to inspection. Moreover, the Directive does not apply to national laws insofar as they provide for the imposition of criminal sanctions on natural persons with the exception of the rules governing the interplay between leniency programmes and the imposition of sanctions on natural persons. It also should not apply to national laws that provide for the imposition of administrative sanctions on natural persons that do not operate as an independent economic actor on a market.  Finally, Member States are not prevented from applying leniency programmes that cover not only secret cartels, but also other infringements of Article 101 TFEU and equivalent provisions of national law, or from accepting leniency applications from natural persons acting in their own name. The Directive should also be without prejudice to leniency programmes in Member States that exclusively provide for immunity from sanctions in criminal proceedings for the enforcement of Article 101TFEU.

47.	The ECN plus Directive essentially seeks to ensure that all NCAs will have enforcement powers that mirror those held by the Commission under Regulation 1/2003. It introduces minimum harmonization rules allowing NCAs to have common investigative and enforcement powers.  That said, for some Member States, the measures in the Directive could translate to a non-reform in practice, since their NCAs already enjoy Commission like enforcement powers, are able to set their own enforcement priorities, and have adequate human and technological resources. The reforms introduced by the Directive are likely to have their most important impact in Member States that have been slow to recognize the importance of safeguarding in law the operational independence and impartiality of their NACs or ensuring that they have adequate funding and staffing to carry out enforcement activities. 

48.	Regulation 1/2003 brought about a fundamental change in the enforcement of EU competition law by granting NCAs and national courts the power to apply, in their entirety, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It further enhanced the decentralized enforcement system by proving for effective cooperation between the Commission and NCAs within the newly established ECN. It is submitted that the ECN plus Directive is the next significant milestone in the history of the public enforcement of EU competition law.  The Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union is arguably an important milestone in harmonizing national procedural and evidential rules for the private enforcement of EU competition law.   There is no doubt that chapters 4 and 5 of the ECN plus Directive will boost the enforcement powers of many NCAs that are members of the ECN and strengthen and intensify their capacity for mutual assistance and collaboration. 

49.	That said, there is some skepticism in some competition law practitioner circles as to whether the provisions in chapter 6 will strengthen the NCAs leniency regimes by boosting the incentives for companies to cooperate with the Commission and NCAs in detecting and sanctioning cartel behavior.​[22]​  This uncertainty persists, they suggest, because the Council and the European Parliament failed to agree on, as originally proposed by the Commission, a one-stop-shop for leniency applications.  Though it is also suggested by critics that this supposed deficiency is partially alleviated by the new rules on summary applications and the requirement for national marker schemes.  Nonetheless, is argued by critics that on balance the failure to establish a binding, coherent and harmonized EU wide leniency regime is likely to make leniency regimes less attractive and therefore less effective. 

50.	According to critics, the Directive has missed several opportunities to make public enforcement even more effective.  They point to the failure to introduce a one-stop-shop for leniency applications or markers, the decision to allow derogations from the prohibition on criminal sanctions for cooperating directors, managers and other staff of immunity applicants, and the failure to devise a more effective system for interim measures as arguably the greatest missed opportunities. With regards to interim measures, critics argue that Article 11 of the Directive provides only for minimum harmonization, the point to the term “at least”. However, it is submitted that the Directive ensures that all NCAs in the ECN will be able to act on their own initiative to order by decisions the imposition of interim measures, which is not the presently the case, and that the “at least” component of the provision does not undermine or diminish in any way the requirement that NCAs must meet in order to act. Namely, that they may do so in cases where there is urgency due to the risk of serious and irreparable harm to competition, on the basis of a prima facie finding of an infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU. 
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